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TRADITIONAL DECISION MAKING IN URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS
Martha G. Logsdon
In the course of trying to identify the role of urbanization in 
social and political change in the third world, social scientists have 
frequently addressed the phenomenon of the carry-over of "rural-tradi­
tional" patterns of behavior to the urban setting. This study looks 
at the methods of decision making in the neighborhoods of Jakarta based 
on data gathered in 1970.* It tries to answer the question, under what 
circumstances and for whom is the traditional system of decision making 
retained in the urban setting; it also offers analysis of why some 
citizens prefer the nontraditional methods of decision making. Two 
types of decisions are considered in this paper: the selection of
neighborhood leaders and decisions to undertake neighborhood activi­
ties .
Decision-Making Models
This study is concerned primarily with two types of decision 
making. One is the majority-rule model, and the other is the unani­
mous-consent model. Decision making through majority rule assumes 
competing interests, with the side achieving 50 percent plus one win­
ning and the other losing. Although a coalition of interests fre­
quently makes up the majority, majority rule does not recognize the 
coalescence of all points of view as an ideal.
Decision making by unanimous consent is only reached when all 
sides are in agreement. Thus, it usually implies considerable discus­
sion and compromise. But the compromise involved here is frequently 
viewed differently from that needed to build a coalition in the major­
ity-rule systems. The basic assumption is that there is a common in­
terest in society--rather than competing interests--which all sides 
will learn to recognize through discussion. There are no "losers” in 
this form of decision making, which results in the good of the whole 
rather than the good of the greater number.
The Europeans who colonized the archipelago introduced majority- 
rule decision making to Indonesia, along with other Western styles of 
governance. Until the institution of Guided Democracy in 1959 the 
national political institutions of independent Indonesia, which were 
copied from Western parliamentary institutions, continued to use this 
form of decision making.
^Financial support for the collection of data came from the NDFL and Fulbright- 
Hays Fellowship programs to which the author is grateful. This paper was originally 
presented in a slightly revised form at the Association for Asian Studies Meeting,
1978.
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For many of the peoples of Indonesia unanimous consent is the 
indigenous decision-making rule. Koentjaraningrat sees musyawarah 
(discussion) and mufakat (unanimous agreement arising out of discus­
sion) as growing out of a cooperative spirit which underlies the vil­
lage sense of community in most Indonesian cultures.
An important manifestation of the gotong-rojong ethos in most Indo­
nesian village communities is the institution of musjawarah. The 
concept involves the processes that develop general agreement and 
consensus in village assemblies, which emerge as the unanimous deci­
sion or mupakat. This unanimous decision can be reached by a process 
in which the majority and minorities approach each other by making 
the necessary readjustments in their respective viewpoints, or by an 
integration of the contrasting standpoints into a new conceptual syn­
thesis. Musjawarah and mupakat thus exclude the possibility that the 
majority will impose its views on the minorities. I4usjawarah and 
mupakat, however, imply the existence of personalities who, by vir­
tue of their leadership, are able to bring together the contrasting 
viewpoints or who have enough imagination to arrive at a synthesis 
integrating the contrasting viewpoints into a new conception.1
This tradition of musyawarah-mufakat is treated here as a rural 
decision-making pattern (rural because it grows out of village tradi­
tion) , but, like majority rule, it has also served in national politi­
cal institutions in Indonesia. Mufakat is one of the five pillars of 
the state in Panca Sila. And when Sukarno instituted Guided Democracy, 
the return to the 1945 Constitution included adoption of unanimous con­
sent as the decision-making rule for Parliament. This change was jus­
tified as a return to a system appropriate to the Indonesian personality 
and as a rejection of an essentially foreign process (majority rule) 
which led parties to fight for their own narrow interests rather than 
for the good of the nation.2 This nationalist use of the concepts of 
musyawarah-mufakat is the ideological basis on which the governments 
decision to maintain the rural tradition in the urban setting rests.
One might assume that such official support for the traditional system 
of decision making gives mufakat a better chance than most rural tradi­
tions of being retained in the urban setting.
None of this discussion is meant to address the question of the 
extent to which musyawarah-mufakat as an ideal is any sort of reflec­
tion of the reality in Indonesian villages today. Villages have felt 
the influence of many outside forces--the Dutch, changing times, urban­
ism itself--which have substantially altered practice in the villages 
so that mufakat may in many areas be mostly a remembered ideal.
As an ideal, musyawarah-mufakat is presumed to be possible because 
even when conflict is present, a village has a cooperative spirit and 
basic unity, a shared value of harmony in the public interest that 
might mitigate the demands of particular interests. It is frequently 
presumed that such conditions are absent in urban areas, that the
1Raden Mas Koentjaraningrat, ed., Villages in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1967), p. 397.
2Sukarno, "Saving the Republic of the Proclamation," in Herbert Feith and Lance 
Castles, eds., Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univer­
sity Press, 1970), pp. 32-89.
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relative heterogeneity of neighborhoods in Jakarta, for instance, makes 
the possibilities for mufakat slim indeed. Majority-rule decision mak­
ing does not require the same sense of cooperation, and common value 
system as does a system in which all participants must agree or at 
least acquiesce, even when the decision harms some particular interest. 
Individualism is the ideal soil in which majority rule can grow, and 
the city has been characterized (by Louis Wirth, Robert Park Ernest 
Burgess, and others of the "Chicago School" of sociology) as an environ­
ment in which the individuals relationships to the rest of society are 
superficial and segmentalized. Heterogeneity, it has been argued, 
broke down old social structures and the individual was left adrift 
with no consensual standards to provide informal controls on his beha­
vior. Subsequent studies have indicated that this view of the city is 
a gross exaggeration; but, especially in the rapidly growing urban areas, 
many residents may well live in an environment which seems strange be­
cause they have been socialized under and for very different conditions.
This is certainly the case in Jakarta, Indonesia, whose population 
has increased by over four million in thirty years. This study looks 
at decision making within neighborhoods in Jakarta and tries to evalu­
ate the extent to which traditional decision-making methods (musyawarah- 
mufakat) are maintained and valued and the extent to which, in practice 
or as an ideal, they have been replaced by majority rule.
Broader Theoretical Implications
Two different sorts of literature deal with the significance of 
maintaining traditional decision-making ideals and practice. First, 
comparative political scientists have transferred many of the assump­
tions of the Chicago School (since discredited for American cities) to 
third-world cities, assuming that recent migrants are suffering from a 
lack of social ties and anomie, conditions likely to make them subject 
to social unrest or demagoguery.3 The extent to which urban communi­
ties engage in consensus decision making can shed light on the adjust­
ment problems of urbanites, since, if a consensus on values is common, 
it is unlikely that members of such communities would suffer from the 
anomie so prevalent in the vision of the Chicago School.
A second theoretical concern with this question comes from policy 
impact analysis. Essentially, this is the question of the difference 
made by the method of decision making. Many officials, at least in 
Jakarta, believe that if a leader is selected by unanimous consent that 
leader can more effectively mobilize people for community projects, 
such as repairing local roads or contributing to an independence day 
celebration.
This study does not provide direct evidence for the outcome of the 
decision-making process and whether it results in social unrest or en­
hanced capacity for group action; but implications for these two broader 
theoretical questions exist within the descriptive empirical data.
3For an excellent discussion of this see Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., nThe Politi­
cal Sociology of Cityward Migration in Latin America: Toward Empirical Theory," in 
Francine Rabinovitz and Felicity Trueblood, eds., Latin American Urban Research, 
Volume I (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 95-119.
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Setting of the Study
This study focuses both on the practice of neighborhood decision 
making and on the values concerning decision making held by urban citi­
zens. The practice of decision making is studied in the process of 
selecting neighborhood leaders, while attitudes are measured by a ques­
tion concerning the method by which community leaders ought to make 
decisions. Thus, basically, this study has two units of analysis--the 
neighborhood election and the individual whose opinion has been mea­
sured. Each of these requires some explanation.
The Neighborhood
The Capital Territory of Jakarta is administered through a multi­
ple-tiered hierarchy of territorial units, the smallest of which is the 
kelurahan. Each kelurahan is further divided into units called rukun 
warga (RW), and these are further divided into rukun tetangga (RT). 
These two units are not administrative units and have no officials to 
staff them, but they are legally sanctioned: laws describe how they
are to be constituted and how officers are to be selected.
It is with the smallest neighborhood unit that this study is pri­
marily concerned. The rukun tetangga is a territorial unit which in­
cludes approximately forty households. The officers are selected 
by the heads of households, and the legally prescribed procedure for 
this is musyawarah-mufakat. The leader of the RT (ketua RT, usually 
called Pak RT when male) has two sorts of functions. Vis-S-vis the 
government, he or she is expected to provide a communications linkage 
with the neighborhood residents and be able to mobilize support for 
various projects to be carried out by local inhabitants.^  To the resi­
dents of the RT the leader’s role varies according to the class of the 
neighborhood. But the ketua RT generally serves as an intermediary 
for individuals in dealing with the lurah (head of the kelurahan) and, 
in lower class neighborhoods, as a kind of father-figure for the com­
munity.
The selection process for these RT leaders will serve as one of 
our indicators of the decision-making process in urban neighborhoods.
Individual Attitudes
In order to measure individual opinion on the questions with which 
we are concerned, a sample was made of household heads by selecting 
fourteen of the 221 kelurahan of the Capital Territory.
The Capital Territory is an overbounded city, so some of its kelu­
rahan are not urban in density or economic base. The sample, then, 
included appropriate proportions of urban and rural areas within the 
bounds of the Capital Territory and also took into account class and 
area of the city in which the kelurahan were situated. In each selected
**For a full listing of the purposes of the RT system, see "Surat Keputusan 
Gubernur/KDH DCI Djakarta no. Ib3/2/14 1966 ttg. Peraturan Dasar Rukun Tetangga dan 
Rukun Warga DCI Djakarta," in DCI Djakarta, Pedoman Pembinaan Wilajah dan P.M.D. 
Chusus DCI Djakarta, n.d.
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kelurahan, four RTs were randomly selected. In those RTs a list of 
all household heads was made, and approximately one-third of all house­
hold heads were randomly selected in the designated RTs. A total of 
548 respondents were thus interviewed.
This sample serves as the basis for analyzing individual attitudes 
toward neighbo *.nood decision making. For this paper only the 370 urban 
residents of the area are included in the analysis. Figures from this 
sample are also used for comparative purposes on election attendance.
The Selection of RT Leaders
The legally prescribed process for recruiting personnel for the 
position of RT chairman is consultation (musyawarah) among all house­
hold heads of the neighborhood and unanimous agreement (mufakat) on 
the appropriate person to hold the position.
Legal norms are not, of course, always reflected in behavior, but 
in this case there seems to be considerable correspondence between the 
two. The fifty-seven neighborhood leaders included in the attitude 
survey report their selection to have occurred in the following ways: 
forty-seven of the fifty-seven claim to have been elected by the neigh­
borhood (forty-five by mufakat and two by majority rule) while the 
other ten came to office in other ways.5 Thus 79 percent of the sample 
of RT chairmen report they came to office by musyawarah-mufakat. 
Majority rule seems not to have made in-roads on the selection process.
Nonetheless, a form can be ostensibly maintained although the 
reality is very different. Musyawarah-mufakat grows out of a rural 
tradition and has been transplanted into the very different social con­
ditions of an urban environment. The process of consultation until 
unanimity is achieved assumes a certain degree of homogeneity, within 
which the interests and goals of all participants coincide, so that 
through discussion they will realize the appropriate decision. Verba 
has called this the Mno-conflictM assumption and has commended with 
regard to attempts to apply results of small group experiments to the 
real world that:
The assumption is valid for a large number of small experimental 
groups artificially insulated from external pressures. Decisions
5Two were officers who became chairmen when the former RT chairman became in­
capable of holding office (one was jailed for alleged involvement in the ’’September 
30 Movement,’’ the other moved). Four RT chairmen (all from the same kelurahan) were 
appointed by the lurah after some consultation with the notables of the neighborhood 
which left them in conflict (the lurah is very unpopular). One was appointed by the 
RW chairman, one was appointed by the old RT chairman when he left, one was appointed 
by several local leaders with no musyawarah, and one was appointed by the Japanese 
during the Occupation. (The latter claims that every year he tries to resign but is 
unable to do so because the people do not want him to). The entire selection process 
occurs in an atmosphere which restricts the choice of chairman to those who are not 
communists. And although the legal situation was very fluid as to whether communists 
could participate in the discussion, the trend seemed to be for them not to do so or 
to support the overwhelmingly popular candidate. This would be natural if they were 
afraid on account of their political background.
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in small face-to-face groups . . . are often made on the basis of 
consensus rather than on the basis of formal vote and majority rule.
In a small face-to-face group made up of peers and relatively iso­
lated from external pressures, there may well be a single group goal 
or a single means to that goal that is in the best interests of all 
members.6
Geertz has shown that the no-conflict assumption is not an accu­
rate description of what occurred in an election he observed in a Cen­
tral Javanese semi-urban area supposedly carried out according to 
musyawarah-mufakat. On this basis he contends that musyawarah-mufakat 
as a political process is observed only as a ratification of decisions 
already reached through conflict-ridden coalition politics.7 In a 
sense Geertz is trying to debunk a widely held myth about Javanese 
village society in a situation where that myth seems only tangentially 
applicable.8
The basic assumptions of musyawarah-mufakat might seem even less 
likely to obtain in the very urban Capital Tertitory where heterogene­
ity of population is more the rule than the exception. Nevertheless, 
the legally prescribed decision-making method remains musyawarah- 
mufakat, and at least in form it is widely followed. Determining the 
extent to which the election meeting actually only ratifies consen- 
sually a decision fought out behind the scenes is thus a necessary 
next step.
To gain insight into the extent of real consensus underlying the 
leadership selection process, five elections were studied.9 By attend­
ing the election meetings as well as interviewing and talking infor­
mally with people in each of the neighborhoods, an attempt was made to 
gauge the extent of prior "behind-the-scenes politicking." In four of 
the five neighborhoods it seems that there was almost no activity be­
fore the meeting. In each of these cases, after the meetings a number 
of people claimed there are never more than three or four appropriate 
people, and the decision is really one of "who to give this burden to."
In the one case where people reported considerable earlier discus­
sion, they indicated that the lurah (a military officer in a civilian 
job) wanted an army private who lived in the neighborhood to be elected
6Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1961), p. 222.
7Clifford Geertz, The Social History of an Indonesian Town (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1965), pp. 153-201.
8Kelurahan Sumbersari--the area of his study— was semi-urban, with a population 
of 7,000 inhabitants, hardly a setting in which real musyawarah might be expected to 
occur through a public meeting. It was made up of six dukuhan (hamlets), three of- 
which tended to coincide with natural villages. The other three either divided or 
grouped natural villages. Some dukuhan had their own special character— being all 
santri or all abangan. While this election may well capture the essence of Mojokuto 
politics, it is not necessarily typical of the practice of mufakat decision making. 
(Ibid., pp. 155-208.)
9These elections were selected because they were the only ones I heard about 
in a four-month period. Four were in relatively low-class neighborhoods, while one 
was middle class overall.
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chairman. The plan was defeated because most people thought the 
lurah’s choice had no claim to distinction and was, therefore, not 
appropriate. Instead, the meeting elected the former RT secretary 
(the old chairman had died), although one other name was suggested. 
Some feeling for the discussion can be gleaned from the following 
notes:
Pak Lurah attended the meeting but was not the chairman of it. As 
soon as the discussion about the RT chairmanship opened, the Kepala 
Kampung (a paid assistant to the Lurah who lived in this RT) sug­
gested that Pak T--  be considered. He was an army man and knew
about security problems. Also he was young and was always home in 
the evenings (when most people try to transmit RT business). An
older man rose and said that while Pak T--  was indeed a good man,
Pak A--  had lived there longer and was even now serving as RT
secretary. He already knew the problems of the RT, and because he 
was old, people valued his advice. Several others agreed that Pak 
A—  would be a good chairman without attacking Pak T— . No one
else spoke for Pak T-- . After several speeches for Pak A---, a
young man suggested Pak R-- . But nobody supported that suggestion,
and another younger man stood up to say that Pak A--  seemed to be
everyone1s choice. The Chairman of the meeting announced that un­
less anyone objected to Pak A-- , he would be the new chairman. No
one did.
The involvement of the lurah was the only exceptional element in 
this election. In the other four elections studied (and in innumerable 
others I heard reports about), some real consensus did exist regarding 
the appropriate candidates. In a group the size of an RT, only two or 
three persons emerge with the status appropriate to the office of 
chairman. Quite frequently some of them may not want to serve or may 
support the candidacy of one of the others.
Based on this limited evidence, a "consensual politics" clearly 
does exist in Jakarta*s neighborhood units when a leader is to be 
chosen. The reasons for this are explored below.
In the first place the RT is a small unit and no more than thirty 
to fifty heads of households are eligible to participate in the elec­
tion. Although this is considerably larger than the groups studied by 
small group theorists like Verba, not everyone participates who is eli­
gible to do so. In the five elections studied, the following numbers 
were present:
1. 22 of 40 eligible members (55 percent)
2. 25 of 39 eligible members (64.1 percent)
3. 10 of 35 eligible members (28.5 percent)
4. 15 of 37 eligible members (40.5 percent)
5. 24 of 36 eligible members (66.6 percent)
In meetings of this size, ranging from ten to twenty-five, it is 
conceivable for discussion to lead to consensus if other social condi­
tions prevail. From our interviews with RT chairmen, it is apparent 
this is the usual group size for elections and in such small units 
people would know each other and their relative status. In the sample 
of Jakarta urban residents 62 percent reported that they attended the 
last RT election they heard about.
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Social conditions in urban neighborhoods are certainly different 
from those of rural villages, but this does not necessarily imply a 
cleavage politics. While urban neighborhoods are no doubt ethnically 
more heterogeneous, they are fairly homogeneous in terms of class. 
Furthermore, the higher rate of mobility in urban areas may actually 
discourage the development of deep and lasting cleavages such as those 
that Geertz found in Sumbersari. There is very little organized poli­
tics within the unit of the RT even though its members may be quite 
active in political parties or interest groups at higher levels.
Either the RT is too small to generate such politics or the issues 
with which it deals cut across the interests reflected at other levels.
But another reason for the possibility of consensual politics 
within the RT is that for most people the stakes involved in the selec­
tion of a leader are low. The Javanese lurah (again, to use Geertzfs 
example) usually gains considerable economic advantage from his office 
through control over village land and other sources of income. The RT 
chairman, on the other hand, gains little in concrete terms by his 
willingness to serve. The sums of money he is legally allowed to col­
lect from his neighbors for such services as preparing letters and per­
mits probably do not even cover the costs of paper and ink. The extra- 
legal money he may try to collect as "cigarette money" (uang rokok) , 
while perhaps a burden or minor irritation to those he serves, is not 
really enough to motivate anyone to fight for the office.10 Too many 
of his tasks as RT chairman offer no financial reward at all.
What, then, does the RT chairman get for what may be a very time- 
consuming job? The best answer seems to be prestige and occasionally 
the satisfaction of feeling a sense of noblesse oblige. In a way it is 
not the prestige which comes from the office but rather a public con­
firmation of prestige or the respect already accorded a person that 
repays him for his time and energy. Virtually no RT chairman claimed 
to be in office for any other kind of benefit (not surprisingly), but 
neither did his neighbor-constituents see the job as providing much 
more than a title and position of respect. Let us listen to some com­
ments by RT chairmen about why they accepted the job.
Somebody around here must be chairman, and people around here think 
I can do the job best.
I was chosen at the meeting even though I wasn*t there because my 
wife was giving birth to our son. I decided to accept even though 
I don’t have much spare time because it is an honor to be chosen.
It shows that people respect (hormat) me.
Even though it takes a lot of time (makan waktu), I accepted because 
someone must serve the people as chairman, and I work in an office, 
so I know office procedures. A lot of people in this RT cannot even 
read or write. Those of us who can have to take on extra responsi­
bilities.
Selection is a confirmation of status, it seems, and a common 
understanding on the social status system is a very important element
10Of those living in urban areas 55.2 percent of the individuals sampled report 
they expect to pay nothing for the RT chairman’s help, 29 percent more expect to pay 
less than Rp.50 (12{), while 16 percent expect to pay more than Rp.50.
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in producing consensus on who shall be the leader. A majority of Indo­
nesia’s cultures, especially those most represented in Jakarta’s popu­
lation, have a very well-developed sense of ’’place.” To function in 
virtually every setting a person must know who is the social superior 
and who the interior. An individual who holds a position for which his 
status is not appropriate is frequently seen as ridiculous. In a 
small, face-to-face environment such as an RT only a few individuals 
would be perceived as appropriate to hold the office of leader.
The smallness of the unit, the face-to-face relationships among 
neighbors, and the absence of lasting social cleavages or organized 
political groups at such a low level, together with the low stakes of 
the office itself, and the Indonesians’ well-developed concept of place 
add up to a situation in which the no-conflict or at least low-conflict 
assumption may be valid for the leadership selection process.
A final and formalistic explanation for why consensus is possible 
lies in the format of the elections, i.e., a public meeting, in the 
context of cultural traditions some of which encourage the appearance 
of harmony.
Even though a particular individual may be unhappy with the devel­
oping consensus and might theoretically be able to prevent a decision 
by persevering in support for his own candidate, once a large number 
of the small face-to-face group seems agreed, the pressure on a dis­
senter to acquiesce is very great. For most Indonesians it is very 
difficult to speak against someone, because that action violates cul­
tural norms of appropriate behavior.11 Harmony is more highly valued 
than ’’winning,” and a person who refuses to concede for the sake of the 
appearance of harmony is frequently poorly thought of. Thus, a lone 
dissenter will feel too embarrassed or ashamed (malu) to pursue his 
disagreement with a developing consensus. In addition, should an indi­
vidual long persist in opposing a person clearly supported by the group 
as a whole, it would be very difficult later for the individual to seek 
the assistance of the leader. Thus, unanimity becomes possible.
One might say that unanimity is possible, in part, because anonym­
ity is not. The lack of secrecy in the musyawarah-mufakat situation 
means that the individual is not isolated from the pressures and hier­
archical influences of the community. Stein Rokkan has described the 
sublime isolation of the person with a secret ballot:
. . . The individual adult is cut off from all his roles in the sub­
ordinate systems of the household, the neighborhood, the work organi­
zation, the church and the civil association and set to act exclu­
sively in the abstract role as a citizen of the overall political 
system. There will be no feed-back from what he does in this anony­
mous role to what he does in the other roles and therefore no need
11The value placed on the appearance of harmony is an important value among 
the major cultures in Indonesia. Obviously it is not the only one. Real conflicts 
run very deep in the society and given a situation where high stakes are involved 
can break out into the open, as in the massive killing that occurred in the months 
following the events of October 1, 1965. But many observers were caught by surprise 
that such violent conflict could occur, especially among the seemingly placid, polite 
Javanese.
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for him to take responsibility for the act of voting in his everyday 
interactions in his regular environment.12
Open consultation is the very opposite of this and thus the individual 
is not "free" to act as he might in isolation.
For all the above mentioned reasons, some consensus can usually 
be reached on the selection of a leader of the RT in Jakarta at least 
without undue conflict.
Individual Attitudes toward Community Decision Making
Other kinds of community decision making give a more mixed picture 
regarding the maintenance of the ideal of unanimous consent. Urban 
Jakarta residents selected for inclusion in the sample were asked the 
following question:
Sometimes in a certain RT there is a proposal for a new activity, 
but not all members of the RT agree with that activity. What is the 
best thing for a neighborhood chairman to do in such a situation: 
wait until everybody is in agreement and only then begin to act, pay 
attention to all kinds of opinions from each side and then decide 
himself, or put into effect the wishes of the- majority of members?13
Table 1 presents the responses of the urban respondents in the sample 
to this question.
Table 1
Procedure Preference for RT Decision 
Making in the Urban Sample
% N
Wait for agreement (mufakat) 31.9 118
Decide himself 18.1 67
Majority opinion 46.5 172
Other solution 3.5 13
Total 100.0 370
From this table it appears that in this instance mufakat is less 
popular a solution than majority rule, though more popular than deci­
sion by the leader. Seemingly, majority rule, which politicians like 
to characterize as foreign to the Indonesian personality, has consider­
able popularity among urban-dwellers. While we have no good data on
12Stein Rokkan, "The Comparative Study of Political Participation: Notes toward 
a Perspective on Current Research," in Charles F. Cnudde and DeaneE. Neubauer, eds., 
Empirical Democratic Theory (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969), p. 356.
13The alternatives were presented in the following way: "Tunggu sampai semua-
nya setuju (mufakat), baru mulai bertindak; memperhatikan segala macam pendapat dari 
setiap pihak, lalu memutuskan sendiri, atau melaksanakan kemauan kebanyakan anggota?" 
The interviewers were instructed to use the word mufakat in relation to the first 
alternative after the pre-tests showed that this clarified the question for respon­
dents.
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the popularity of majority rule among rural people,14* it does seem that 
the traditional, rural-based procedure which the government supports 
is not as popular as the ’’foreign” procedure in Jakarta’s neighborhoods. 
In order to understand the process better, it is necessary to look at 
what kind of citizen prefers which method of decision making.
What might one hypothesize about who will prefer the traditional 
mufakat method and who the other solutions? One might suppose that the 
more recent migrants to the city would prefer the more traditional 
method since they might be deemed to be closer to their rural origins 
than long-time residents of the city. One might hypothesize that older 
residents would be more in favor of mufakat than younger residents, on 
the grounds that aging is frequently associated with conservatism and 
youth might be more attracted to the more ’’modern” majority rule. One 
might hypothesize that ethnicity will make some difference. Perhaps 
the Javanese with their tremendous emphasis on harmony could be ex­
pected to be more mufakat-oriented than other ethnic groups. One might 
hypothesize that higher educational levels and contact with the mass 
media (both perhaps indicators of participation in the ’’modern” sector 
and both frequently assumed to be a by-product of urbanization) will 
be associated with a preference for majority rule. Finally, one might 
thus assume that the higher one’s class the more one is aware of ’’for­
eign” ideas and the more one might participate in an ’’urban culture” 
which rejects rural-based traditions. Each of these hypotheses will 
be considered in turn to try to clarify the conditions under which 
mufakat as an ideal survives.
Table 2
Length of Urban Residence and Preferred Procedure
Preferred
Procedure
Length of Residence in Jakarta
Less than 
5 Years 5-10 11-15
15+ but Not 
Born Here
15+ and 
Born Here
Wait for agreement 20.0% 34.0% 39.1% 29.1% 35.5%
Decide himself 6.7 16.0 17.4 21.2 18.3
Majority rule 63.3 48.0 39.1 46.4 44.1
Other solution 10.0 2.0 4.3 3.3 2.2
N = 370 (30) (50) (46) (151) (93)
x2 is not significant at .50
Table 2 presents the results of the cross-tabulation of the pre­
ferred decision-making procedure with the length of time the individual 
has lived in Jakarta. This table indicates that length of residency 
has no statistically significant relationship with the preferred deci­
sion-making method. Far from showing the recent migrant to prefer the 
traditional method, those in the city less than five years seem to pre­
fer majority rule over mufakat more than the others.
14*The rural population included in this survey is in no way typical of rural 
areas in Indonesia both because it is so close to a large urban area and because it 
is made up for the most part of the ethnic Betawi. In this rural sample 48 percent 
preferred mufakat, 35 percent preferred majority rule and 16 percent preferred that 
the leader decide.
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Table 3
Age and Preferred Procedure
Preferred
Procedure
Age
Under 30 30-40 41-60 61 +
Wait for agreement 25.0% 34.5% 33.6% 29.4%
Decide himself 13.2 18.6 19.1 29.4
Majority rule 57.9 44.1 43.5 41.2
Other solution 3.9 2.8 3.8 .0
N = 369 (76) (145) (131) (17)
x2 not significant at .5913
Table 3 indicates that age is also not significantly associated 
with preference for the rural-based tradition. The oldest people seem 
somewhat more willing to leave the decision to the leader and the 
youngest seem to like majority rule more than the other categories, 
but the total relationship is not statistically significant.
Table 4
Ethnicity and Preferred Procedure
Preferred
Procedure
Ethnicity
Betawi Javanese Sundanese Sumatran Other Indon.
Other
Foreign Chinese
Wait for agreement 37.7% 32.6% 28.8% 41.9% 18.8% 14.3% 20.7%
Decide himself 16.4 20.6 19.2 16.3 31.3 0.0 6.8
Majority rule 44.3 43.3 50.7 37.2 43.8 85.7 62.1
Other solution 1.6 3.5 1.4 4.7 6.3 0.0 10.3
N = 370 (61) (141) (73) (43) (16) (7) (29)
x2 not significant at .2366
Although it might have been assumed that ethnicity would influence 
individual attitudes on neighborhood decision making because of the 
varying emphasis placed by different cultures on unanimous consent,
Table 4 indicates that it is not statistically significant. The high­
est support for mufakat comes from the various ethnic groups from Suma­
tra. All these Sumatran groups were collapsed into one category because 
they made up such a small part of the sample. The Javanese, who might 
be expected to show strong support for mufakat, in fact preferred major­
ity rule, as did every group but the Sumatrans.
Lerner, in his attempt to develop an empirically based theory of 
"modernization," suggested that increasing urbanization has tended to 
result in higher literacy rates, which in turn have led to greater par­
ticipation in the mass media. For Lerner the significance of the mass 
media lies in its ability to enable people to imagine themselves in 
situations they have not experienced, a condition he equates with 
"modernity” and which he believes will ultimately lead to the demand
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for political participation and ultimately electoral participation.15 
If Lerner’s model is accurate, one might expect that those who read 
newspapers will be less inclined to favor the traditional system of 
decision. Caught up in the broader world and participating in the 
"modern way of life" one might expect to see majority rule as most 
popular with these urban-dwellers.
Table 5
Newspaper Readership and Preferred Procedure
Preferred Number of Newspapers Read
Procedure None 1 2 3 or More
Wait for agreement 34.5% 35.4% 21.2% 35.8%
Decide himself 11.8 16.8 25.9 22.6
Majority rule 52.9 45.1 45.9 35.8
Other solution 0.8 2.7 7.1 5.7
N = 370 (119) (113) (85) (53)
x2 significant at .0253
However, the data suggests just the opposite is the case. As 
Table 5 shows, majority rule is most popular for neighborhood decision 
making among those who report reading no newspapers. The number of 
newspapers read does not seem to influence the preference for mufakat. 
The real difference lies in the increased popularity of letting the 
leader decide himself, which (contrary to what one would expect in 
Lerner's model) is most popular among those who read two or three news­
papers. The relationships are statistically significant. When all 
non-readers are excluded, the frequency of newspaper reading is not 
statistically significant, as Table 6 illustrates.
Table 6
Frequency of Readership and Preferred Procedure
Preferred
Procedure
How Often Newspapers are Read
Daily Twice a Week
Once a Week 
or Less
Wait for agreement 32.0% 33.3% 26.2%
Decide himself 20.7 15.2 24.6
Majority rule 41.3 45.5 49.2
Other solution 6.0 6.1 0.0
N = 248 (150) (33) (65)
x2 not significant at .4102
15Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: The Free Press, 
1958), p. 60.
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Newspaper readership might, of course, simply be a surrogate for 
education, or education might have an independent effect. Ignoring for 
the moment the multi-collinearity problem, Table 7 presents the rela­
tionship between education and preference for neighborhood decision­
making procedures.
Table 7
Education and Preferred Procedure
Education
Preferred ----------------------------------
Procedure None 1-3Years
4-6
Years
7-9
Years
10-12
Years
College 
not Grad.
College
Grad.
Wait for agreement 40.9% 37.8% 27.9% 27.4% 25.4% 38.5% 40.5%
Decide himself 11.4 2.7 15.4 24.2 22.0 34.6 21.6
Majority rule 47.7 51.4 54.8 43.5 49.2 23.1 32.4
Other solution 0.0 8.1 1.9 4.8 3.4 3.8 5.4
N = 369 (44) (37) (104) (62) (59) (26) (37)
x2 significant at .0546
The relationship presented here is statistically significant.
Close examination of this table reveals some anomalies. Those who have 
attended at least some college and those who have had no education are 
the strongest supporters of mufakat. While one might expect the col­
lege educated to be the least traditional in views, here that is not 
the case. This could possibly be the result of political education in 
colleges where (especially during the Sukarno period) great emphasis 
was put on nationalist values, including mufakat.
The other way in which education seems to make a difference is in 
the slightly greater popularity of the least participant" option (in 
Lerner's sense), that of leaving the decision to the leader. Majority 
rule is least popular with the college educated. Of course, education 
and class are closely related, so the relationship between class and 
decision-making values is presented in Table 8 to help clarify what is 
going on.
Table 8
Class and Preferred Procedure
Preferred
Procedure
Class
Upper Middle Lower Very Low
Wait for agreement 38.2% 33.1% 28.0% 37.0%
Decide himself 23.5 23.1 16.0 3.7
Majority rule 32.4 38.5 53.7 59.3
Other solution 5.9 5.4 2.3 0.0
N = 366 (34) (130) (175) (27)
x2 significant at .0494
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As Table 8 indicates, the relationship is statistically signifi­
cant. Mufakat is the choice of a roughly similar proportion of all 
classes (though slightly more preferred by the highest and the lowest 
classes). However, the lower one’s class, the more majority rule is 
preferred, and the upper classes are far more likely than the lowest 
class to choose the option of letting the leader decide.
What explains this pattern, which is quite contrary in many re­
spects from the expected results? Class as measured here is a gener­
alized ,!style-of-life" indicator. The Interviewer who was an indige­
nous Indonesian judged class on the basis of the respondent’s home, 
furniture, appliances, neighborhood, and education. In short, class 
is a measure of status as much as wealth. To understand the results 
on class, and indeed the results from the other tables as well, it is 
necessary to reexamine the status situation in the neighborhood.
Our question did not specify what precisely the decision to be 
made was. Thus, the stakes involved are unclear. To a Jakartan, 
though, the kinds of decisions likely to be made in a neighborhood are 
well-known, and to outsiders they may be trivial. Shall we have a 
neighborhood celebration for Independence Day? Should we all get to­
gether Sunday morning and repair the holes in the dirt road? Should 
we all contribute ten cents to buy some books for the new reading room?
The participants’ estimate of the significance of the decisions 
depends on their relative position in the system. Contributing funds 
is not nearly so significant to the upper as to the lowest class. And 
perhaps one could postulate that the upper classes prefer to leave de­
cisions to the leader because RT affairs strike many of them as unim­
portant and not worth wasting time on. This is much less true as one 
moves down the class scale.
The popularity of majority rule among the lower classes remains 
to be explained. An absolute majority of the two lowest classes pre­
ferred it, despite the fact that they are the least educated and the 
least likely to read newspapers, and thus one might expect, the least 
likely to have ’’foreign” values. Why might the poorest be least 
’’traditional” in the urban setting?
The answer which seems most consistent with the data lies in an 
analysis of the benefits the different classes derive from each sort of 
decision making. The poor are generally a majority in their neighbor­
hoods. But under mufakat it is quite possible that final decisions 
will not represent their interests, as the winner is likely to be the 
person who maintains his position longest. Because of their strong 
sense of appropriate behavior, many participants would find it very 
difficult openly to oppose the opinion of a status superior. The re­
sult of a mufakat system is, thus, often to advance the interests of 
the higher status individuals, perhaps at the expense of the majority. 
These higher status people would therefore have an interest either in 
maintaining mufakat, or, in a trivial matter, allowing the leader to 
decide.
Neighborhood decision making about activities must be differen­
tiated from decisions on leadership selection. In leadership selection 
the same sense of ’’place” serves to produce the possibility of unanim­
ity, as those viewed as inappropriate usually do not aspire to office.
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But on issue decisions where individual stakes, especially for the poor 
person, may be higher, majority rule seems preferable. It protects the 
interests of the lower status people without requiring any one indivi­
dual to oppose personally the will of a social superior or act in an 
inappropriate way.
Such an interpretation, of course, implies that no basis exists 
for real consensus on issues when the stakes are perceived as signifi­
cant, in that the urban neighborhood may be too diverse to sustain the 
no-conflict assumption. From these data it seems reasonable to con­
clude that class interests serve as the best explanation for holding a 
particular opinion on decision making. The only other variables sig­
nificantly associated with preferred decision-making procedure were 
number of newspapers read and education. The direction of each of 
these is the same as the class data, suggesting that it is class style 
of life rather than the kind of effect Lerner expects which is produc­
ing the noted effect.16
Because class is a sort of summary variable for a style of life 
of which education and media participation are a part, it is impossible 
to sort out empirically exactly what is happening. The status explana­
tion is only a beginning, and its implications for the political system 
are unclear.
Conclusion
The government of the Capital Territory of Jakarta has attempted 
to sustain the practice of a rural decision-making process in a setting 
where the basic assumptions of the process seem not to obtain. We have 
looked at reasons why the rural decision-making system has continued to 
work for the selection of neighborhood leaders, but we have also seen 
that majority rule is frequently favored as a decision-making process 
on neighborhood issues especially among those low in the status system. 
The urban setting affects the selection of decision-making procedures, 
but the choice between tradition-maintenance and change is somewhat 
more complex than some social theorists have described.
16This could be expressed more precisely in terms of the probable existence of 
a multi-collinearity problem where length of residence, low newspaper readership, 
education, and class are related to one another. Here we are offering the interpre­
tation that class is a sort of summary variable which includes the others.
